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According to Beck’s cognitive model of depression the activation of dysfunctional beliefs 
triggers negative automatic thoughts, which can be interpreted as the proximal “cause” for 
emotional, somatic, and motivational symptoms of depression.  This top-down processes of 
beliefs causing thoughts and furthermore of thoughts causing symptoms can be called “cognitive 
hierarchy”.  Besides these processes there are bottom-up influences as well with dysfunctional 
beliefs being activated by external and internal events.  A differentiation between top-down 
processes and bottom-up influences can be drawn with the first being seen as causing thoughts 
and emotions while the latter only activate existing beliefs.  To test Beck’s maintenance and the 
vulnerability hypothesis considering the cognitive hierarchy we suggest an experimental 
paradigm to experimentally manipulate beliefs, thoughts, and emotions separately and 
independent from each other.  To test both hypotheses in an experimental paradigm depressed 
and nondepressed subjects are asked to concentrate on new beliefs, thoughts, or emotions during 
the imagination of personally stressful life events in two studies.  Based on the top-down 
processes it was posited that concentration on new beliefs should lead to changes on all three 
levels of experience.  Adding a new thought should cause changes on the levels of thoughts and 
emotions while new emotions should only change the level of emotions.  The results confirm our 
hypotheses concerning beliefs and thoughts, but adding emotions changes the levels of thoughts 
as well as emotions.  The results support the central role of beliefs in the development and 
maintenance of depressive symptoms. 
 







Beck’s cognitive model of depression (1976, 1987) postulates the existence of three levels of 
experience with bidirectional influences on each other: Beliefs, thoughts, and emotions.  
Following Beck (1976, 1987) and Ellis (1991), beliefs are common basic attitudes about the self, 
other people, the world, and the own relationship to the world.  Dysfunctional beliefs in 
particular are presumed by Beck (1976, 1987) to be crucial for the development and maintenance 
of depressive symptoms.  Beliefs are categorized as dysfunctional if they expressed or implied 
dogmatic, rigid, illogical, global ideas about acceptance and competence.  When dysfunctional 
beliefs are activated, an information processing bias can be observed, so that these beliefs guide 
the perception and interpretation of situations, leading to a better perception, memory, and recall 
of information congruent to them, while incongruent information is processed less efficiently. 
Accordingly, activation of dysfunctional beliefs triggers so-called negative automatic 
thoughts.  Automatic thoughts in general are understood as temporary, non-emotional mental 
events, which are subjective plausible in a certain situation (Beck 1976, 1987).  These automatic 
thoughts can be interpreted as the proximal “cause” for the emotional as well as somatic and 
motivational symptoms of depression.  This top-down processes of beliefs causing thoughts and 
furthermore of thoughts causing symptoms can be called cognitive hierarchy. A dysfunctional 
cognitive hierarchy in particular is defined to be triggered by dysfunctional beliefs. 
Besides these top-down processes there are important bottom-up influences as well with 
dysfunctional beliefs beeing activated by external (e.g., stressful life events; Monroe & Simons, 
1991) and internal events (e.g., thoughts or emotions).  These bidirectional influences can lead to 
the impression of similar processes in both directions.  Nevertheless, a differentiation can be 





influences activate existing beliefs (Ellis, 1962; Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998; review for the 
mood-state hypothesis see Segal & Ingram, 1994). 
For cognitively vulnerable subjects, activating events can precipitate a pattern of negatively 
biased, self-refering information processing through the activation of dysfunctional beliefs (Segal 
& Ingram, 1994).  This process initiates the first cycle in a downward spiral of depression in 
those subjects (vulnerability hypothesis) and leads to the maintenance of the symptoms through 
the described information processing bias (maintenance hypothesis).  In contrast, non-vulnerable 
subjects react with an appropriate level of distress (e.g., sadness) to activating events, but do not 
start a downward spiral into depression (Segal & Ingram, 1994; Segal, Shaw, Vella, & Katz, 
1992). 
Many cross-sectional studies examining the correlation between beliefs and depression as well 
as thoughts and depression, provide support for the maintenance hypothesis (e.g., Garber, Weiss, 
& Shanley, 1993; Weisz, Sweeney, Proffitt, & Carr, 1993; for a review see Segal & Ingram, 
1994). Although three important prospective behavioral high-risk studies examined the 
vulnerability hypothesis, it has not yet found conclusive support (Alloy et al., 1999; Alloy, 
Abramson, Whitehouse, Hogan, Panzarella, & Rose, 2006; Hankin, Abramson, Miller, & 
Haeffel, 2004; Lewinsohn, Joiner, & Rohde, 2001). 
In their 36-month prospective longitudinal analysis with 349 students, Alloy et al. (1999) 
found a greater likelihood to develop a major depression for high-risk students than for low-risk 
students (17% vs. 1%).  Students in this study were assigned to the high-risk group by scoring 
high on dysfunctional beliefs and pessimistic attributional style (stability, globality, 





themselves imply, no definite conclusion can be drawn about the role of dysfunctional beliefs as 
vulnerability factors because of this mixture of beliefs and attributional style. 
In their one-year prospective longitudinal analysis with 1507 adolescents (9th to 12h grade) 
Lewinsohn et al. (2001) examined the effects of pessimistic attributional style and dysfunctional 
beliefs on depression separately.  In interaction with stressful life events, both, pessimistic 
attributional style as well as dysfunctional beliefs, predicted the diagnosis of depression one year 
later.  However, none of these interactions between stressful life events and dysfunctional beliefs 
or attributional style could be shown to be significant predictors for self-reported depressive 
symptoms (Lewinsohn et al., 2001). 
Finally, Hankin et al. (2004) analyzed the influence of dysfunctional beliefs independent of 
pessimistic attributional style.  In each of their three longitudinal studies with a total of 559 
unselected undergraduate students a significant influence of the interaction between 
dysfunctional beliefs and life events on self-reported depressive symptoms as well as on 
depressive disorders became obvious. 
Although the presented cross-sectional and prospective longitudinal studies support the 
maintenance as well as the vulnerability hypothesis, it can not be concluded that beliefs represent 
the sole maintenance and vulnerability factor within the cognitive hierarchy, because none of 
these studies controlled the influence of the two other levels of experience (thoughts and 
emotions) on self-reported depressive symptoms and diagnosis of depression, respectively.  
Therefore, we suggest an experimental paradigm to experimentally manipulate beliefs, thoughts, 
and emotions separately and independent from each other, in order to examine the existence of 
the proposed cognitive hierarchy as well as the influence of each level of experience on 





For this experimental paradigm, the top-down processes and bottom-up influences between all 
three levels of experience have to be taken into account (Ellis, 1962; Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 
1998; review for the mood-state hypothesis see Segal & Ingram, 1994).  As bottom-up influences 
are based on existing elements that are not activated at a particular moment, one way to control 
the bottom-up influences is to activate all existing elements on each of the three levels of 
experience before the experimental manipulation.  A suitable method for this purpose is the 
imagination of a personally stressful life event (for a review see Westermann, Spies, & Hesse, 
1996).  As shown earlier, this procedure allows for separate manipulations of beliefs, thoughts, 
and emotions (Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1986, 1991).  If our interpretation of the cognitive hierarchy is 
correct only top-down processes should be measurable during experimental manipulations on the 
separate levels of experience while bottom-up influences can be kept constant. 
Based on these considerations, our first study tests the following hypothesis related to the 
maintenance hypothesis:  If depressed subjects concentrate on new functional beliefs during the 
imagination of personally stressful life events, changes should occur on all three levels of 
experience.  Adding positive thoughts should cause changes on the levels of thoughts and 
emotions while new positive emotions should only change the level of emotions. 
Our second study tests the following hypothesis derived from the vulnerability hypothesis:  If 
nondepressed subjects concentrate on new dysfunctional beliefs during the imagination of 
personally stressful life events, changes should occur on all three levels of experience.  Adding 
negative thoughts should cause changes on the levels of thoughts and emotions while new 







Material and Methods 
Participants 
Participants in Study 1 were 40 women with a current diagnosis of major depression or 
dysthymia based on DSM-IV criteria (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  Their age ranged from 20 to 57 years with a mean of 
30.55 years and a standard deviation of 10.87 years.  The participants were recruited by local 
newspapers and received $25 for participation.  The sample was restricted to women to avoid 
gender as a confounding variable.  The decision to focus on female participants is justified 
through the fact that women suffer from depressive episodes twice as often as men during the 
course of their lives following the DSM-IV (APA, 1994).  An informed consent was obtained for 
all participants.  To reduce social desirability and response biases we explained the aim of the 
study not until the end of the experiment. 
Measures 
Beck-Depression Inventory (BDI): The BDI (Beck & Steer, 1987) is a 21-item self-report 
instrument that assesses cognitive, affective, motivational, and physiological symptoms of 
depression.  Scores on this instrument range from 0 to 63.  The BDI was used as a screening 
instrument for the selection of probably depressed participants.  With  = .83 (Cronbachs Alpha) 
the internal consistency of the BDI in our samples is in the range of the internal consistencies 
reported in the German standardization study ( = .74 to .95; Hautzinger, Bailer, Worall, & 
Keller, 1995). 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I): The SCID-I (First, 
Gibbon, Spitzer, & Williams, 1996) is a semi-standardized clinical interview, to assess diagnosis 





depression or dysthymia and without any other psychopathological disorders were allowed to 
participate. 
The SCID interviews were conducted by clinical psychologists, after passing a special SCID 
training program.  The final psychiatric diagnoses were provided by consensus of two SCID 
interviewers according to Spitzer’s procedure (Spitzer, 1983).  The interrater reliability 
concerning affective disorders was 0.95 (kappa). 
Exploration of emotions, thoughts, and beliefs:  Exploration of individual emotions, 
thoughts, and beliefs based on A. T. Beck’s approach (Beck, A. T. & Rush, 1985).  The three-
column technique was used to explore thoughts and emotions (A. T. Beck, 1976).  With this 
technique, the interviewer supports the participants to distinguish their emotions and thoughts 
from an external event (e. g., description of surroundings and people involved, the behavior of 
the participant and others involved).  For further analyses, the interviewer asked the participant 
about associations between each thought and particular emotions, and about associations between 
each emotion and particular thoughts, respectively. 
In order to explore core beliefs, the downward arrow technique was utilized (Burns, 1999).  
Hence, based on the thoughts explored in the three-column technique, participants were asked: 
“What would it mean to you if [thought of the participant] matched reality?”  The first answer 
was recorded and the same question was repeated with this answer.  This procedure was 
continued until the participant described the same statement three times in a row with similar 
words.  Following Burns (1999), this resulting statement represents an important belief.  The 
described downward arrow technique was repeated for each thought named by the participant.  
This combination of triple column technique and downward arrow technique is common in 





Finally, the participants estimated the intensity for each emotion, the degree of engagement 
for each thought, and the strength of conviction for each belief (conviction values).  The 
questions read as follows: 
“On a scale from 0 to 100%, how strong is this emotion compared to the maximum strength 
imaginable for this emotion?” 
“On a scale from 0 to 100%, how strongly have you been preoccupied with this thought 
compared to the maximum strength imaginable?” 
“On a scale from 0 to 100%, how strong is your conviction about this belief?” 
All interviews were conducted by two clinical psychologists, who had passed a two day 
training by the first author.  While the first interviewer conducted the interview with the 
participants, the assignment of the second interviewer was to control and ensure the adherence to 
the interview manual.  Furthermore, the interview session was recorded by both interviewer and 
the final data were provided by consensus. 
Procedure 
In order to select participants suitable for the experiment, a two-level selection process was 
completed.  In the first step, potential participants were chosen with the BDI.  In this study, only 
participants with a BDI score of 16 and above were assigned preliminarily to the study, all other 
participants were excluded.  In the second step of the selection, SCID-I was conducted to identify 
and exclude all participants (a) without a major depression or dysthymia diagnosis, (b) with other 
psychological disorders, that may lead to major depression or dysthymia (psychotic disorders, 






Afterwards, all participating women had to report a personally stressful life event to explore 
beliefs, thoughts, and emotions following Beck (1976) and Burns (1999) as described above.  
Personally stressful life events were used to activate latent dysfunctional beliefs.  In study 1 the 
depressed participants were explicitly asked about situations in which they had felt depressive as 
described in SCID-I. 
Approximately one week after the selection, in accordance with Beck’s imaginative approach, 
(1976) each participant was asked to imagine the reported situation four times in detail (one 
baseline condition and three treatment conditions).  The conditions were separated by one hour 
breaks, where participants were allowed to relax, eat their lunch and/or read magazines in the lab.  
To control the effects of order and habituation, the four conditions (approximately half an hour 
each) were balanced between the participants.  Within the baseline condition the depressed 
participants were only asked to imagine their stressful life event, while under treatment 
conditions they had to add new more functional beliefs or positive thoughts respectively 
emotions to this imagination.  A similar procedure is often used in cognitive psychotherapy 
(Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1986, 1991), especially with Axis II patients (Beck, J. S., 1995).  In an 
empirical study with patients Ellis (1986) could show that this procedure is highly effective and 
able to change beliefs in a short time. 
The added elements (beliefs, thoughts, or emotions) were specified through cooperation 
between the experimenter and the participant immediately previous to each treatment condition.  
Therefore, the experimenter asked for a belief (a thought and emotion, respectively, in the other 
treatment conditions) that could have been helpful for the participant within the chosen situation.  





the results neither activated beliefs, nor already existing thoughts and emotions within the 
personally stressful life events were added during of the treatment conditions. 
In order to add new positive elements in study 1, the participants were asked to repeatedly 
concentrate on the specified positive elements (e. g. a positive belief like “I am loveable!”) 
during the treatment imaginations.  This technique differs significantly from normal cognitive-
behavioral therapy strategies.  However, this strategy seems beneficial to influence beliefs, 
thoughts, and emotions separately and independent from each other. 
Immediately after each imagination, the participants were asked to estimated the strength of 
conviction for each belief, the degree of engagement for each thought, and the intensity for each 
emotion during the imagination. 
Data Analysis 
Categorization of emotions, thoughts, and beliefs:  Emotions, thoughts, and beliefs were 
subsequently subdivided into positive and negative.  For this, the same procedure was used as in 
preceding research (Kuiper & Derry, 1982; Pössel, 2003; Pössel & Holzhay, 2006; Schwartz & 
Garamoni, 1986), following Russel and Mehrabian (1977).  Thereby, emotions were assigned to 
the categories positive or negative according to their emotional valence.  Based on the association 
given by the participant, affiliated thoughts were assigned to the same category as the emotions.   
Based on A. T. Beck and Rush (1985) beliefs were classified as dysfunctional or functional.  
They were categorized as dysfunctional if they expressed or implied dogmatic, rigid, illogical, 
global ideas about acceptance and competence.  All other beliefs were classified as functional. 
Calculation of power values: To integrate positive and negative values on each level in one 
figure and to reduce the number of statistical analyses, data were integrated by calculating so-





positive and negative emotions. These values of power were used to calculate a states-of-emotion 
called ratio for emotions by the formula of Schwartz (Schwartz, 1997).1 This procedure was 
repeated for thoughts (states-of-thought) as well as beliefs (states-of-belief).  Based on Schwartz 
et al’s model (1997) lower values represent a more negative ratio that is connected with 
increasingly severe depression (mild: .42 to .58; moderate: .34 to .41; severe: .10 to .33; 
profound: .00 to .09).  Higher values represent a more positive ratio that is usually correlated 
with more positive features (range: .59 to .90) or in the case of an extreme positive ratio with 
unrealistic optimism and mania (range: .91 to 1.00). 
Calculation of reliability: The classification in emotions, thoughts and beliefs as well as 
positive/negative and functional/dysfunctional, respectively, was revised by two psychologists 
with a minimum of two years of clinical (therapy) experience.  These raters reassessed separately 
and independently from each other as well as blind to the exploration condition (baseline vs. 
addition of beliefs vs. addition of thoughts vs. addition of emotions).  The interrater reliability for 
emotions and thoughts was both  = 1.00, and the interrater reliability of the beliefs reached  = 
.85, which indicates close to perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977).  Furthermore, the 
interrater reliability for the classification as positive vs. negative and functional vs. dysfunctional 
elements was  = .92. 
Statistical analyses: The statistical analysis was based on the ratios described above. For 
beliefs, thoughts, and emotions separate analyses of variance for repeated measures with the 
following conditions were calculated for the depressed participants: Baseline, addition of beliefs, 
addition of thoughts, and addition of emotions.  The reported significance levels were corrected 
                                                          






by degrees of freedom according to Greenhouse and Geisser (1959).  The values of significance 
of the post-hoc tests were adjusted with the Bonferroni correction (Diehl & Arbinger, 1993).  
Since we only generated hypotheses for three of six possible t-tests within each analysis of 
variance, only these t-tests were conducted.  The levels of significance for the pairwise 
comparisons have been adjusted accordingly, allowing significance only if p  .016 ( = 5%). 
 
Results 
The descriptive data of the depressed participants’ ratios and the results of the analyses of 
variance which were all significant are presented in Table 1. 
In the adjusted post-hoc tests significant differences are revealed between the conditions 
addition of beliefs and baseline in the states-of-belief (t(39) = - 8.16, p < .001), the states-of-
thought (t(37) = - 2.71, p = .010), and the states-of-emotion (t(37) = - 3.82, p < .001). For the 
condition addition of thoughts, no significant difference to the baseline condition can be shown 
for the states-of-belief (t(39) = - 1.53, p = .133), but for the states-of-thought (t(37) = - 7.62, p < 
.001) and the states-of-emotion (t(39) = - 4.37, p < .001).  The conditions addition of emotions 
and baseline differ not significantly for the states-of-belief (t(39) = - 2.35, p = .024), but for the 
states-of-thought (t(37) = - 2.68, p = .011) and the states-of-emotion (t(37) = - 8.36, p < .001).  
All results but the significant difference between the conditions addition of emotions and 
baseline for the states-of-thought are according to the hypothesis. 
 
Discussion 
After activating existing beliefs, thoughts, and emotions connected to a specific personally 





thoughts, and emotions) while experimental manipulations of thoughts and emotions showed no 
effects on beliefs.  Therefore, the results of the experimental manipulation of beliefs and thoughts 
are in accordance with the cognitive hierarchy and with the maintenance hypothesis.  However, 
the addition of emotions induced an unpredicted effect on the level of thoughts, referring to the 
cognitive hierarchy.  Given these intriguing results, Study 2 tests the vulnerability hypothesis 




Material and Methods 
Participants 
Participants for Study 2 were 48 women without any current or lifetime diagnosis following 
DSM-IV (APA, 1994).  The age of these subjects reach from 20 to 49 years with a mean of 25.50 
and a standard deviation of 7.97.  Previous research concerned with intended changes support the 
notion that it is more complicated to influence a person in a negative than in a positive direction 
(e.g.  McCabe, Gotlib, & Martin, 2000; for a review see Westermann et al., 1996).  As 
nondepressed participants were supposed to be influenced in a negative direction, a greater 
sample size was used than in the first study in order to balance the presumably lower effect sizes.  
The participants were recruited by local newspapers and were paid $25 for participation.  
Informed consent was obtained by participants. To reduce social desirability and response biases 
we explained the aim of the study not until the end of the experiment. 
Measures 






In both studies identical procedures were used.  Differences only occur firstly in the selection 
criteria of the participants: To select nondepressed participants only women with a BDI score of 
ten and below and no current or lifetime DSM-IV (APA, 1994) diagnosis in SCID-I were 
allowed to take part in the experiment.  Secondly, there are differences in the added elements 
(beliefs, thoughts, and emotions): While the depressed participants in study 1 were asked to add 
positive elements, the nondepressed participants in this study were asked to add new negative 
and dysfunctional elements, respectively, by repeatedly concentrating on them during the 
treatment imaginations.  Similar to study 1, the added elements (belief, thought, or emotion) were 
specified through cooperation between the experimenter and the participant immediately before 
each treatment condition.  That is, the experimenter asked for a belief (a thought and an emotion, 
respectively, in the other treatment conditions) that would be negative for the participant within 
the chosen situation.  Negative and dysfunctional elements, respectively, as stated by the subjects 
in study 1 were used as examples. 
The interrater reliability concerning affective disorders in study 2 was 0.95 (kappa). 
Data Analysis 
The classification in emotions, thoughts and beliefs as well as positive/negative and 
functional/dysfunctional, respectively, was revised by the same rater than in study 1.   The 
statistical analyses for study 2 were identical to those for study 1 (see above). 
The interrater reliability for emotions and thoughts was both  = 1.00, and the interrater 
reliability of the beliefs reached  = .84, which indicates close to perfect agreement (Landis & 
Koch, 1977). Furthermore, the interrater reliability for the classification as positive vs. negative 







The descriptive data of the depressed participants’ ratios and the results of the analyses of 
variance which were all significant are presented in Table I. 
In the adjusted post-hoc tests a significant difference between the conditions addition of 
beliefs and baseline is revealed for the states-of-belief (t(47) = 7.50, p < .001), the states-of-
thought (t(47) = 2.57, p = .013), and the states-of-emotion (t(47) = 5.94, p < .001).  Furthermore, 
while the comparison between the conditions addition of thoughts and baseline is not significant 
for the states-of-belief (t(47) = 1.63, p = .109), the comparisons show significant differences for 
the states-of-thought (t(47) = 4.48, p < .001) and the states-of-emotion (t(47) = 3.30, p = .002).  
Finally, the comparison between the conditions addition of emotions and baseline show no 
significant difference for the states-of-belief (t(47) = 2.23, p = .030), while the differences are 
significant for the states-of-thought (t(47) = 2.49, p = .016) and the states-of-emotion (t(47) = 
5.66, p < .001).  All results beside the significant difference between the conditions addition of 
emotions and baseline for the states-of-thought are according to the hypothesis. 
 
Discussion 
In accordance with the cognitive hierarchy and vulnerability hypothesis the addition of 
negative beliefs affected all three levels of experience (beliefs, thoughts, and emotions), while 
experimental manipulations of thoughts and emotions showed no effects on beliefs.  But contrary 
to the ideas of the cognitive hierarchy the addition of negative emotions induced an unpredicted 







Due to the cognitive model of Beck (1976, 1987), dysfunctional beliefs are central for the 
development (vulnerability hypothesis) and maintenance (maintenance hypothesis) of depressive 
symptoms.  Following the hypothesis regarding the cognitive hierarchy, activated dysfunctional 
beliefs lead to depressive symptoms due to their influence on the information processing and 
automatic thoughts.  Although many cross-sectional and prospective longitudinal studies give 
support to the maintenance and vulnerability hypothesis, it can not be concluded that beliefs 
represent the only maintenance and vulnerability factors within the cognitive hierarchy, because 
these studies did not control the influence of thoughts and emotions.  To test the influence of 
beliefs, thoughts, and emotions separately an experimental paradigm was used.  In this 
experimental paradigm, existing negative elements of the participants on all levels of experience 
(beliefs, thoughts, and emotions) were activated by the imagination of a past personally stressful 
life event to control the impact of bottom-up influences.  Concerning the maintenance hypothesis 
it was predicted that if depressed subjects concentrate on new functional beliefs during the 
imagination of personally stressful life events, changes should occur on all three levels of 
experience.  Adding positive thoughts should cause changes on the levels of thoughts and 
emotions while new positive emotions should only change the level of emotions. Concerning the 
vulnerability hypotheses, it was expected that if nondepressed subjects concentrate on new 
dysfunctional beliefs during the imagination of personally stressful life events, changes should 
occur on all three levels of experience.  Adding negative thoughts should cause changes on the 






In both studies the addition of new beliefs affected all three levels of experience (beliefs, 
thoughts, and emotions), while experimental manipulations of thoughts and emotions showed no 
effects on beliefs.  Therefore, the results of the experimental manipulation of beliefs and thoughts 
are in accordance with the maintenance and vulnerability hypothesis.  However, the addition of 
emotions induced an unpredicted effect on the level of thoughts. 
One possible explanation might be a carry-over effect between the addition of thoughts and 
emotions.  If this was true, there should be a carry-over effect between these two conditions and 
the addition of beliefs as well.  However, the addition of beliefs shows a different pattern than 
the addition of the two other elements which contradicts the carry-over effect as explanation.  
Furthermore, carry-over effects should be controlled by the balance of the order of all conditions.  
However, a design allocating subjects randomly to baseline and one treatment condition would 
be an alternative and probably more effective to study the cognitive hierarchy. 
A theoretically based explanation for a carry-over effect on the levels of thoughts and 
emotions might be that rumination was measured by asking the participants how preoccupied 
they are with their thoughts.  Given the strong relationship between rumination and negative 
emotion (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004), this could explain why the experimental manipulation of 
emotions also leads to changes on the level of thoughts.  When integrated in Beck’s model and 
the cognitive hierarchy this would mean that, at least some thoughts and emotions, are located on 
one level of experience.  This idea would support the strong interdependence of both levels as 
postulated by Ellis (1962), as well as by the mood-state hypothesis (Ingram et al., 1998). 
Another possible explanation for the influence of the addition of emotions on thoughts might 
be that some subjects have limited abilities to imagine personally stressful life event.  In subjects 





manner, which can lead to an activation of existing thoughts by adding of a new emotion.  
Inconsistent with this explanation an activation of existing beliefs would be expected as well, if 
bottom-up influences are not controlled adequately. 
The different effects of the experimental manipulation of beliefs on the one hand and thoughts 
and emotions on the other hand give strong support for a successful attempt to influence the 
levels of experience separately and corroborates the experimental paradigm as effective to study 
the interdependencies within the cognitive hierarchy. 
It has to be noted that the ratios of beliefs, thoughts, and emotions at baseline are relatively 
low compared with earlier studies (review see Schwartz, 1997).  This difference between the 
study presented here and earlier studies might base on a negative valence of the personally 
stressful life events, described by the ratios.   This is in line with some earlier studies which 
report these ratios to be dependent on the valence of situations involved in the studies (e.g., 
Fichten, Amsel, Robillard, & Tagalakis, 1991; Michelson, Schwartz, & Marchione, 1991; 
Treadwell & Kendall, 1996). 
The presented studies have to acknowledge several limitations: They refer to (a) the exclusive 
use of self-report data, (b) missing control of the ability to imagine the personally stressful life 
event, (c) the lack of examination of depressive symptoms, and (c) the exclusive participation of 
female subjects with comorbid diagnoses.  
The exclusive use of self-reports can lead to doubts, whether the participants have the ability 
to differentiate between beliefs and thoughts by introspection.  If participants are not able to 
differentiate, manipulations on both levels should show the same effect.  However, in both 
studies different findings for beliefs and thoughts were revealed, which argues against this 





participants who were asked to concentrate on a dysfunctional belief might be more likely to 
endorse dysfunctional beliefs or even negative thoughts and emotions later.  If this was true, the 
concentration on one element (belief, thought, or emotion) should lead to a change on the 
affected level of experience but not on one of the other levels of experience.  The results of both 
studies concerning the addition of beliefs and thoughts are contradictory to this idea.  However, 
the use of more experimental methods to measure the three levels of experience should be 
prefered in further research.  One alternative could be the application of the self-reference 
encoding task-paradigm (SRET; Kuiper & Derry, 1982) that focuses on differential information 
processing characteristics between depressed and nondepressed subjects.  In this paradigm, 
participants are asked to decide, whether certain adjectives are descriptive for themselves.  
Afterwards the power of recollection for adjectives with different valences is determined.  In 
previous research it was shown, that depressed subjects remember more negative self-descriptive 
adjectives than nondepressed subjects (e.g., McCabe et al., 2000).  Another possibility could be a 
writing speed task to measure psychomotor retardation which correlates positively with negative 
emotions.  During this task subjects are asked to write down as many numbers from 100 in 
descending order as possible in a certain time (Gotlib, Ranganath, & Rosenfeld, 1998).  But 
writing speed shows only correlations with emotions, but does not measure emotions itself, so it 
can not be used as a mean to examine all three levels of experience. 
As mentioned above, it can not be ruled out that some subjects have only limited abilities to 
imagine personally stressful life events which might be a reason for the unexpected influence of 
emotions on thoughts.  Therefore, in future studies this ability should be measured (e.g., with the 





Another limitation of the study is the restriction to depressed women without comorbid 
disorders.  Although the decision to prefer female participants is justified through the higher 
incidence rate for depression in women, and previous research did not find gender differences in 
dysfunctional beliefs (Lewinsohn, Seeley, & Gotlib, 1997), this constriction leads to limitations 
concerning the generalizability of the presented results.  Therefore, future research should focus 
on both genders.  As comorbidity is more the rule than an exception in depressive disorders, the 
restriction on participants without comorbid disorders clearly limits the external validity.  Hence, 
future research should consider the inclusion of participants with different comorbid disorders. 
Finally, it can be seen as limitation that each subject participated in all three treatment 
conditions (addition of beliefs, thoughts, emotions), as carry-over effects can not be completely 
ruled out.  We controlled such a possible bias by balancing the order of all conditions, and no 
indications for any carry-offer effect became obvious in both studies.  Nevertheless, a design 
allocating subjects randomly to baseline and one treatment condition would be a considerable 
alternative. 
In summarizing, the results support the central role of beliefs in the development and 
maintenance of depressive symptoms based on the cognitive hierarchy of Beck’s cognitive model 
of depression.  Contrary to the expectations there seem to be bidirectional influences of thoughts 
and emotions.  Therefore, it can be assumed that thoughts and emotions are on one level of 
experience, supporting the strong interdependence postulated by Ellis (1962), as well as by the 
mood-state hypothesis (Ingram et al., 1998). 
The different effects of the experimental manipulation of beliefs on the one hand and thoughts 
and emotions on the other hand give strong support for a successful attempt to influence the 





and thoughts show that the participants were able to differentiate between beliefs and thoughts by 
introspection.  This indicates that the used dependent variables and the experimental 
manipulation are reliable variables and procedures, respectively, to study the cognitive hierarchy.  
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addition of beliefs 
Mean/SD 
addition of thoughts 
Mean/SD 
addition of emotions 
Mean/SD 
F-value df p 
Study 1        
states-of-belief .17/.16 .40/.18 .21/.20 .24/.22 26.55 1.77/68.97 .001** 
states-of-thought .18/.15 .30/.25 .36/.13 .27/.24 11.16 1.73/63.87 .001** 
states-of-emotion .22/.18 .37/.23 .36/.24 .49/.18 17.67 2.43/89.86 .001** 
Study 2        
states-of-belief .48/.27 .35/.24 .46/.29 .45/.28 21.05 1.61/75.73 .001** 
states-of-thought .34/.20 .26/.18 .28/.20 .27/.17 3.53 1.69/79.47 .048* 
states-of-emotion .29/.19 .16/.14 .21/.16 .15/.12 22.71 1.95/91.42 .001** 
Footnote: * p < .05; ** p < .01 
                                                          
2 Data of power values for separate positive and negative elements are available from the authors. 
